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COMPELLING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
IN BANKRUPTCY CASES:




The vast majority of civil litigation is settled, not tried.2 This practice is
favored by our judicial system.3  Settlement agreements are, like so many other
nonbankruptcy concepts, directly affected by a bankruptcy filing. This Article
will initially review the procedural requirements of settlements reached after a
bankruptcy filing and proceed to the requisites of enforcing a settlement agree-
ment in a bankruptcy case. It will conclude with a discussion of the litigants'
and their attorneys' potential exposure for breached settlement agreements.
II. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY CASES
In nonbankruptcy situations, parties to a dispute may settle their dispute on
whatever terms they can agree upon, subject to basic illegalities. In bankruptcy
cases, the parties to a settlement are not the only interested participants. The
views of the bankruptcy court, the creditors of the debtor, the debtor, the bank-
ruptcy trustee, if one has been appointed, the United States trustee, and the par-
ticular parties to the dispute must all be considered." Despite the input required
by these parties, there is no particular subsection of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code'
which governs compromises in bankruptcy cases.
1. Neil P. Olack is a shareholder with Watkins Ludlam Winter & Stennis, RA., in Jackson, Mississippi, a
Fellow of the American College of Bankruptcy, Member of the Board of Directors of the American Bankruptcy
Institute, past President of the Mississippi Bankruptcy Conference, Inc., and board certified in business bank-
ruptcy law by, and Member of, the Board of Directors of the American Board of Certification. Kristina M.
Johnson is an associate with Watkins Ludlam Winter & Stennis, PA., a member of the Mississippi Bankruptcy
Conference, Inc. and the American Bankruptcy Institute, and past President of the Mississippi Women Lawyers
Association.
These materials are designed to provide general information in regard to the subject matter covered. They
are provided with the understanding that the author is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other pro-
fessional services. Although prepared by a professional, these materials should not be utilized as a substitute
for professional service in specific situations or cases. If legal advice or other assistance is required, the service
of a professional should be sought.
2. United States District Courts, Civil Cases Terminated, By Nature of Suit and Action Taken [Land
Condemnation Cases Omitted] During The Twelve Month Period Ended June 30, 1997, Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, Statistics Division (finding 3% reach trial); Ostrom & Kauder, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1995: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, 22 (National
Center for State Courts 1996) (finding overall, 3.3% of the general civil filings across the counties are disposed
of by trial).
3. E.g., Thomas v. State, 534 E2d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1976).
4. See infra FED. R. Civ. P. 9019(a); see also 11 U.S.C. § 102(l) (1978):
(I) "after notice and hearing," or a similar phrase--
(A) means after such notice as is appropriate in the particular circumstances, and such opportu-
nity for a hearing as is appropriate in the particular circumstances; but
(B) authorizes an act without an actual hearing if such notice is given properly and if
(i) such a hearing is not requested timely by a party in interest; or
(ii) there is insufficient time for a hearing to be commenced before such act must be done,
and the court authorizes such act.
5. All Code provisions refer to the BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (1978).
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Any dispute of the debtor will be either a liability or an asset of the bankruptcy
estate, depending on the debtor's relative position in the dispute. The most com-
mon example of this scenario is when a debtor is a party to litigation which was
pending prior to the bankruptcy filing. If the debtor is the plaintiff, then the law-
suit is an asset of the estate under § 541.8
It follows, then, that the lawsuit will be a potential liability if the debtor is the
defendant.7 If the suit involves counterclaims, cross-claims, and/or third-party
defendants, the analysis becomes more complex, though the basic composition
will remain the same.
A. The Procedure
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019(a) governs the procedure for
obtaining the views of all of the aforementioned necessary participants. Rule
9019(a) provides:
(a) COMPROMISE. On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing,
the court may approve a compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given
to creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and indenture trustees as
provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the court may direct.8
Rule 2002(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) TWENTY-DAY NOTICES TO PARTIES IN INTEREST. Except as provid-
ed in subdivisions (h), (i) and (1) of this rule, the clerk, or some other per-
son as the court may direct, shall give the debtor, the trustee, all creditors
and indenture trustees at least 20 days' notice by mail of:
(3) the hearing on approval of a compromise or settlement of a contro-
versy other than approval of an agreement pursuant to Rule 4001(d),
unless the court for cause shown directs that notice not be sent .... 9
Rule 9019(b) provides an abbreviated procedure for settlements within a class
of disputes:
(b) AUTHORITY TO COMPROMISE OR SETTLE CONTROVER-
SIES WITHIN CLASSES. After a hearing on such notice as the
court may direct, the court may fix a class or classes of controversies
and authorize the trustee to compromise or settle controversies with-
in such class or classes without further hearing or notice.1
This shortened procedure permits efficient handling of multiple matters, such as
the compromise of objections to proofs of claim, preference litigation, and col-
lection litigation on behalf of the estate.
6. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 541.08, at 541-41 (Lawrence P. King, 15th ed., revised 1997).
7. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 521.06[2][a], at 521-17 (Lawrence P. King, 15th ed., revised 1997).
8. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).
9. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002.
10. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(b).
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B. The Standard for Approval of Settlements
Because there is no Bankruptcy Code section which provides guidance for the
creation of settlement agreements, courts have formulated a multi-pronged
analysis of such agreements. A basic policy in bankruptcy cases is that compro-
mise is favored.11 Courts have built on this policy by adopting the standards set
forth in the United States Supreme Court decision, Protective Committee for
Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson. 2 In TMT, the
Supreme Court held that a compromise would be approved by the bankruptcy
court only after it
apprise[s itself] of all facts necessary for an intelligent and objective opinion of
the probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be litigated. Further, the
judge should form an educated estimate of the complexity, expense, and likely
duration of such litigation, the possible difficulties of collecting on any judg-
ment which might be obtained, and all other factors relevant to a full and fair
assessment of the wisdom of the proposed compromise.
1 3
With few variations based on local precedential authority, courts have held that
the following factors must be reviewed before a compromise proposed in a bank-
ruptcy case will be approved:
(a) [t]he probability of success in the litigation;
(b) the difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the matter of collection;
(c) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense, inconvenience
and delay necessarily attending it;
(d) the paramount interest of the creditors and a proper deference to their
reasonable views in the premises.14
The Fifth Circuit standard has been stated recently in Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.:
(1) [t]he probability of success in the litigation, with due consideration for the
uncertainty in fact and law,
(2) [t]he complexity and likely duration of the litigation and any attendant
expense, inconvenience and delay, and
(3) [a]ll other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise. s
These factors have been summarized as requiring the compromise to be "fair and
equitable" and "in the best interests of the estate."1" The Fifth Circuit in Cajun
Electric noted that "[t]he 'fair and equitable standard' is not as vague as it might
11. 10 COLLIER ON BANKRurcy 9019.01, at 9019-2 (Lawrence P. King, 15th ed., revised 1997).
12. 390 U.S. 414 (1968).
13. Id. at 424.
14. 10 COLLIER 9019.02, at 9019-4.
15. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. (In re Cajun Elec. Power
Coop., Inc.), 119 E3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 1997).
16. TMT, 390 U.S. at 424; Cajun Elec., 119 E3d at 355.
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appear to be. The words 'fair and equitable' are terms of art--they mean that
senior interests are entitled to full priority over junior ones." 7
The Fifth Circuit stated in great detail in Cajun Electric the analysis under
each prong of the settlement test. The court held that with regard to the first fac-
tor, that of analyzing the probability of success of the litigation or dispute at
issue, the court need not conduct a mini-trial to determine the outcome of the
claims which are the subject of the dispute being settled. 8 Rather, "[t]he judge
need only apprise himself of the relevant facts and law so that he can make an
informed and intelligent decision." 9
The second factor, that of the complexity, duration, and expense of continued
litigation, is a factual presentation to the court of the law on the legal issues and
the facts involved, the likelihood of appeal, and the necessary expense associated
therewith.2" The third and final factor under the Fifth Circuit's statement of the
settlement standard actually includes "two additional factors that bear on the
decision to approve a proposed settlement."2 These are: (1) "the best interests of
the creditors, 'with proper deference to their reasonable views"' and (2) "'the
extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and
not of fraud or collusion' ."22 It is important to note that with regard to the first of
these additional factors, "the 'desires of the creditors are not binding'."23 Rather,
the court should consider the creditors' best interests in the overall scope of the
case.
24
These are considerations that the court must factor into its approval process
when a motion to approve a settlement is filed with the court. These are likewise
the factors that parties-in-interest, such as creditors in the case, may use to chal-
lenge the approval of the settlement. If an objection to the motion to approve a
settlement is filed, then the motion will be heard as a contested matter under
Rule 9014. The court will have a hearing on the motion where evidence on each
of the settlement factors will be presented. If an objection is not filed, the court
need not hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the compromise pro-
posed passes muster.25 Parties presenting the motion to approve the settlement
should detail the settlement and present evidence in the motion in support of the
factors necessary for approval by the court. If the factors are met and the court
approves the settlement, the court should make detailed findings on each of the
factors to support any challenge on appeal.26
17. Cajun Elec., 119 E3d at 355 (quoting United States v. Aweco, Inc. (In re Aweco, Inc.), 725 F.2d 293, 298
(5th Cir. 1984)).
18. Id. at 356.
19. Id. (quoting La Salle Nat'l Bank v. Holland (In re American Reserve Corp.), 841 F2d 159, 163 (7th Cir.
1987)).
20. Id. at 357.
21. Id. at 356.
22. Id. (quoting Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. United Co. Fin. Corp. (In re Foster Mortgage Corp.), 68
F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995)).
23. Id. at 358 (quoting Foster, 68 F.3d at 917).
24. Id.
25. 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9019.02, at 9019-4 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed., revised 1997).
26. Id.
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III. ENFORCING A SETTLEMENT
It is surprising how often parties or attorneys will agree to a settlement of
pending litigation and then attempt to renege on the agreement. Consider the
following hypothetical: a business Chapter 11 case is pending in a Mississippi
bankruptcy court. The parties to disputes in the case have agreed to mediation
before a bankruptcy judge. The disputes include contested matters and adversary
proceedings. After four days of mediation, the parties and their counsel believe
that a settlement has been reached. In fact, the debtor's counsel, in the presence
of the debtor's representative, acknowledges the specific terms of the settlement
agreement before the parties and their counsel meet with the bankruptcy judge.
After reviewing all of the terms of the settlement agreement with the bankruptcy
judge, the representative of the debtor announces that he has had a change of
heart. He specifically states that he does not want to give a complete release as
previously agreed, but instead wants to reserve certain claims for his company.
The mediation is concluded. Counsel for one of the parties is asked by his client
what action should be taken. All of the parties and their counsel, excluding the
debtor, still believe that the settlement is in the best interest of all concerned.
What is the appropriate analysis?
In the Fifth Circuit, "[s]ettlement agreements have always been a favored
means of resolving disputes."27 The law in the Fifth Circuit is clear that "settle-
ment agreements, when fairly arrived at and properly entered into, are generally
viewed as binding, final, and as conclusive of the rights of the parties as is a
judgment entered by the court. '28 Additionally, settlement agreements may not
"129be repudiated "[a]bsent fraud, deception, coercion or overreaching ....
In light of these principles, the bankruptcy court has the inherent power not
only to recognize and encourage settlements, but also to enforce such agreements
when reached by the parties." The power of courts to recognize and enforce set-
tlements supports what the Fifth Circuit has addressed as "three important goals
encouraged by our judicial system: voluntary settlements of disputes, the
enforcement of agreements according to the objective intent of the parties, and
an end to litigation."31
A. Applicable Law Controlling Enforcement
Because a compromise is a contract, a court, when faced with the issue of
enforcement, must determine whether an agreement was reached under applica-
ble state law, unless there is a federal jurisdiction issue involved in the creation of
27. Thomas v. State, 534 E2d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1976).
28. Rodriguez v. Via Metro. Transit Sys., 802 E2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Thomas, 534 E2d at 613,
and Cia Anon Venezolana de Navegacion v. Harris, 374 E2d 33 (5th Cir. 1967)).
29. Rodriguez, 802 E2d at 129 (citing Strange v. Gulf & S. Am. Steamship Co., 495 E2d 1235 (5th Cir.
1974)).
30. Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 E3d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1994).
31. Id. at 450.
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the agreement. 2 This concept flows into a bankruptcy court's enforcement of
settlements."
In Houston, OTR v. Holder (In re Omni Video, Inc.), the Fifth Circuit addressed
a bankruptcy trustee's motion to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement in
an adversarial proceeding by stating that there is
[n]o strong federal interest in the issue of the validity of settlements entered into
to resolve a bankruptcy suit. Federal bankruptcy law fails to address the validity
of settlements and this gap should be filled by state law. As we have held in fed-
eral diversity suits, a settlement is a contract that is best resolved by reference to
state contracts law. 4
Which state's laws govern the enforcement issue in the hypothetical? The set-
tlement was reached after many hours of discussion during a mediation ordered
by the bankruptcy court located in Mississippi. The mediation occurred as a
result of a notice of the bankruptcy court in Mississippi. The mediation took
place and the agreement was reached and potentially breached in Mississippi.
The debtor is a Mississippi corporation. All of these material ties to Mississippi
exist despite the parties' various origins. Accordingly, Mississippi law should
control the enforcement of the settlement.3
B. Mississippi Law on Compromise and Settlements
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long held that the enforcement of settle-
ments is governed by contract law.3 1 In Middlesex Banking Co. v. Field, the
Mississippi Supreme Court, as early as 1904, recognized the need to enforce set-
tlements of pending litigation. 7 In recognizing this principle in Field, the court
held that the complainant was
[clapable of contracting, fully informed, advised of her rights and her prospects,
counseled by attorneys of unblemished character and of unquestioned ability,
[and] after full and calm deliberation.... convert[ed] her chances of future suc-
cess into ready cash. Such a transaction is supported by every principle of law
and justice and right."
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held in State v. Thomas 9 that agreeing to end litiga-
tion is sufficient consideration to enforce settlement agreements.
32. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Accardo, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11997 (E.D. La. 1995).
33. See, e.g., Houston, OTR v. Holder (In re Omni Video, Inc.), 60 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1995); Equity
Management II Corp. v. Carroll Canyon Assoc. (In re Carroll Canyon Assoc.), 73 B.R. 236, 238 (S.D: Miss.
1987).
34. Omni, 60 E3d at 232.
35. Id.
36. Middlesex Banking Co. v. Field, 37 So. 139, 149 (Miss. 1904) (Truly, J., specially concurring).
37. Id. at 148.
38. Id. at 149.
39. 464 F.2d 156, 159 n.3 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Mississippi law).
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C. An Objective Standard
In Hudgins v. Security Bank (In re Hudgins)," the Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Texas addressed a case factually similar to the hypothetical.
The Chapter 11 debtors and a creditor reached a settlement agreement after a 14-
hour mediation session. While a "Settlement Agreement" was roughed out and
signed by the parties at the conclusion of the mediation, the agreement contem-
plated more formal documentation. The creditor maintained that there was mere-
ly an "agreement to agree" and that the documentation at the close of the media-
tion session was part of ongoing negotiations.' The bankruptcy court, however,
held that the subsequent documentation was meant only to formalize the agree-
ment of the parties and that "at the conclusion of the mediation all parties
believed they had reached an agreement which resolved all issues between the
parties."42 In so holding, the bankruptcy court followed the cardinal rule of con-
tracts law that "[t]he determination of whether there was a meeting of the minds
must be based on objective standards of what parties said and did and not on
their alleged respective states of mind." 3
This principle applies in the hypothetical. All parties and their counsel at the
mediation understood that the intent of the mediation was to attempt a settlement
of the various issues involved in the debtor's case affecting the parties. The
debtor and its counsel agreed to the settlement. To the extent that the debtor's
representative "harbored a secret intent ... " to withhold a right from the settle-
ment, this secret intent cannot justify setting aside a settlement which was agreed
to and relied upon by all persons present or represented at the mediation, based
upon their objective understanding." As in the Fifth Circuit decision of Bell v.
Schexnayder, from "all outward appearances, the settlement negotiations were
intended to resolve all claims and release the [parties] from all liability relating
to the subject matter of the [debtor's case]."4" The debtor's representatives can-
not, after the settlement was reached, make the allegation that he did not intend
for the settlement to be all-inclusive.
D. Lack of a Writing or Record Is Irrelevant
Does the lack of a writing or court record preclude enforcement? Enforcement
should not be precluded in the hypothetical because Mississippi law recognizes
oral settlements." As such, the material terms of the settlement reached at the
end of the mediation are binding and enforceable against the debtor, despite the lack
of a writing evidencing the specific terms of the settlement. It has been held that
40. 188 B.R. 938 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995).
41. Id. at 941.
42. Id. at 942.
43. Id.
44. Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Accardo, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11997, 2 (E.D. La. 1995).
45. Bell, 36 F.3d at 450.
46. Collins v. Dixie Transp., Inc., 543 So. 2d 160, 166-67 (Miss. 1989); Taylor v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 519 So. 2d 436, 437-38 (Miss. 1988); but cf Travis v. Hartford Acc. & Idem. Co., 630 So. 2d 337 (Miss.
1993); Houser v. Brent Towing Co., 610 So. 2d 363, 365 (Miss. 1992).
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"[F]ifth Circuit precedent does not demand that the court have the terms of the rele-
vant written settlement agreement before it in order to enforce oral settlement agree-
ments.'" 7 Additionally, settlement agreements which contemplate further documen-
tation are as effective as if the settlement had been fully documented. 8
E. A Party Is Bound by His Attorneys Agreement to Settlement
In the hypothetical, the debtor accepted the settlement through his or her
authorized representative. To the extent that the debtor's representative should
later deny this fact, however, the result is the same since his counsel accepted the
settlement. It should be noted that counsel accepted the settlement in the pres-
ence of the debtor's representative with the representative's manifest approval.
As with the law governing the enforcement of settlements, Mississippi law is
clear that a client is bound by the acts of his or her attorney."9 This is true in all
aspects of the attorney-client relationship, including representations to the
court."0 The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a client is bound by the
statement of his or her attorney "[w]hen, during the course of a trial [the] attor-
ney, with intent to influence the ruling or decision by the court on a point in
issue, makes a solemn statement to the court committing his client to some legal
position on the issue before the court. . .. " ,
In this regard, the Mississippi Supreme Court has also stated the following:
An attorney, employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit, has prima facie
authority to make relevant judicial admissions by pleadings, oral or written stip-
ulations, or formal statements into the record, which unless allowed to be with-
drawn are conclusive .... Therefore, the plaintiff should be bound not only by
his own admissions but also the admissions of his attorneys since they were
obviously made in the course and scope of his authority to manage the conduct
of the lawsuit. s2
In fact, any stipulations or agreements made by an attorney are binding on a
client, notwithstanding the client's actual knowledge of or consent to those stipu-
lations or agreements.'
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, confusion existed as to whether the plain-
tiff was proceeding on a theory of negligence or assault and battery."s The plain-
tiff's attorney, therefore, assured the court that the plaintiff's theory was based on
negligence.5 The court then held that the party was bound by the attorney's rep-
47. Noble Drilling, Inc. v. Davis, 64 F3d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing the enforceability of oral set-
tlement agreements); see also Strange v. Gulf & S. Am. Steamship Co., Inc., 495 F.2d 1235, 1236 (5th Cir.
1974) (stating an oral agreement to settle is enforceable).
48. Hudgins v. Security Bank, 188 B.R. 938, 941 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995).
49. Stringer v. State, 627 So. 2d 326, 330 (Miss. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2684 (1994); Pace v.
Financial Sec. Life, 608 So. 2d 1135, 1138 (Miss. 1992).
50. Webb v. Jackson, 583 So. 2d 946, 952 (Miss. 1991).
51. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So. 2d 898, 900 (Miss. 1981).
52. Henry v. Gulf Coast Mosquito Control Comm'n, 645 F. Supp. 1447, 1456 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
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resentation.5 s The Mississippi Supreme Court quoted from 7A C.J.S. Attorney
and Client § 205(a) in support of its conclusion:
An attorney employed for purposes of litigation has the general implied or
apparent authority to enter into such stipulations or agreements, in connection
with the conduct of litigation, as appear to be necessary or expedient for the
advancement of his client's interests or to accomplishment of the purpose for
which the attorney was employed.s7
The legal principle from which attorney authority arises is the apparent author-
ity of an agent acting on behalf of a principal.' The Fifth Circuit addressed this
issue specifically in Terrain Enterprises, Inc. v. Western Casualty & Surety Co.
Two weeks before trial, an attorney for the plaintiff directed a settlement offer to
the attorney for the defendant. Defense counsel accepted the offer. The plaintiff
then attempted to renounce the settlement as unauthorized. In response, the
defendant moved to enforce the settlement. The trial court found that a settle-
ment offer had been made and accepted between the parties' attorneys, but that
there was a misunderstanding between the plaintiff and its attorney regarding the
attorney's authority to settle the case. 9 The trial court, therefore, sent the issues
on the merits of the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. 0
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that it was uncontradicted that "there was an
offer of settlement by counsel for [the plaintiff] and an acceptance by counsel for
[the defendant]."61 In light of this finding, the Fifth Circuit recognized its long-
standing position that "[w]here the parties, acting in good faith, settle a contro-
versy, the courts will enforce the compromise without regard to what the result
might have been had the parties chosen to litigate."62
The Fifth Circuit further held that Mississippi law regarding apparent authority
governed the determination of whether the plaintiff's counsel in Terrain Enter-
prises in fact bound the plaintiff to the settlement.' In so doing, the Fifth Circuit
noted that Mississippi law provides
[a]n act is considered to be within the agent's apparent authority when a third
party is justified in concluding that the agent is authorized to perform it from
the nature of the duties which are entrusted to him .... Apparent authority is to
be determined from the acts of the principal and requires reliance and good faith
on the part of the third party.64
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 205(a)).
58. Terrain Enters., Inc. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 774 E2d 1320, 1322 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1121 (1986).





64. Id. at 1322.
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Additionally, the Fifth Circuit held that an attorney who has represented a party
throughout litigation is presumed to be authorized to take any and all action nec-
essary to conduct the litigation."
In Terrain Enterprises, the Fifth Circuit also recognized that Mississippi law
requires a party who is challenging counsel's authority to act to suffer the burden
of proof on this issue." Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that, because the
plaintiff in Terrain Enterprises failed to offer any proof that its attorney exceeded
his apparent authority to act on the plaintiff's behalf, the defendant was justified
in relying in good faith upon the settlement offer made by plaintiff's counsel,
based upon said counsel's previous actions as representative of the plaintiff and
its agents.
67
Similarly, in McCain v. Cox, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi held that a party who benefited from the services of an attorney and
who acquiesced therein could not later repudiate the acts of that attorney, despite
the fact that the attorney was not actually representing the party.68 McCain
involved a complicated real estate transaction. The court found that two attor-
neys were authorized to act for the purchaser in obtaining amendments to a con-
tract for the purchase of real estate. The court further found that although the
attorneys had been employed by a third party, the purchaser was aware of the
attorneys' involvement and accepted the benefits of their services, attempting to
renounce their authority to bind the purchaser only after the real estate transac-
tion fell through.66  The court specifically found that the purchaser had acqui-
esced in the attorneys' request for an extension of time on the real estate transac-
tion and that, despite the purchaser's contention that the attorneys were not acting
as his attorneys, his failure to disclaim the attorneys' acknowledgment of the
extended deadline to seek contract modifications clothed the attorneys with
apparent authority to act on the purchaser's behalf.70 As such, the court found that
the purchaser was estopped from disavowing the attorneys' apparent authority.
7'
According to the hypothetical, the debtor's representative was present at and
participated in the mediation. Consequently, he was fully informed and advised
of the details of the settlement. Moreover, he consulted with counsel during the
course of the mediation prior to agreeing to the settlement. Conferring with
counsel immediately in advance of agreeing to settle has been held to be strong
evidence in favor of enforcing settlement agreements.72
65. Id. (citing Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Majure, 168 So. 468 (Miss. 1936)); see also Federal Land Bank v.
Sullivan, 430 N.W2d 700 (S.D. 1988); Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1986).
66. Terrain Enters., Inc. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 774 E2d 1320, 1322 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1121 (1986) (citing Hirsch Bros. & Co. v. R.E. Kennington Co., 124 So. 344 (Miss. 1929)).
67. Id.
68. McCain v. Cox, 531 F. Supp. 771, 779-81 (N.D. Miss. 1982), affd, 692 E2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982).
69. McCain, 531 F. Supp. at 779.
70. Id. at 781.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 464 F.2d 156, 159 n.3 (5th Cir. 1972); Middlesex Banking Co. v. Field, 37 So.
139, 148-49 (Miss. 1904).
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F Consent to Settlement May Not Be Withdrawn
The Fifth Circuit has held, in White Farm Equipment Co. v. Kupcho, that "a set-
tlement agreement once entered into cannot be repudiated by either party and
will be summarily enforced."73 White Farm involved a challenge to the entry of a
judgment on a settlement which had been read into the record and approved by
the court where one party attempted to withdraw from the settlement prior to
entry of the judgment.7 ' The Fifth Circuit held that "[1]itigants may not disavow
compacts thus made and approved, for avoiding the bargain would undermine its
contractual validity, increase litigation, and impair efficient judicial administra-
tion.""5 Where parties "compose their differences, . . . they may not back and
fill."7 Here, the debtor's attempt to renounce the settlement flies squarely in the
face of the Fifth Circuit's rationale in White Farm.
G. The Settlement May Not Be Avoided for Mistake
There was no mistake in the hypothetical that the settlement was reached, nor
what its terms were. Even if there had been a mistake by the debtor's representa-
tive, unilateral mistakes as to the terms of settlements made by parties thereto
and their counsel may not serve as a basis to invalidate the settlement, absent evi-
dence of fraud, duress, overreaching, or misconduct.7 7
The Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. is instructive.78 The plaintiff's attorney in Taylor offered to settle the person-
al injury claim.79 The defendant accepted the offer and forwarded plaintiff's
attorney a check and a release. 80 The release was not signed and the check was
never cashed.81 The plaintiff's medical condition deteriorated, and she returned
the check and release, demanding an increase in the settlement amount.82 The
court found that when the defendant's attorney accepted the original settlement
demand, the plaintiff became bound by her attorney and could not subsequently
increase the demand."
Neither fraud, duress, overreaching, nor misconduct is involved in this hypo-
thetical. Instead, the parties to the mediation reached an agreement and did so
73. White Farm Equip. Co. v. Kupeho, 792 F.2d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Cia Anon Venezolana de
Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1967)).
74. White Farm, 792 E2d at 527.
75. Id. at 528.
76. Id. at 530.
77. Taylor v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 519 So. 2d 436, 437 (Miss. 1988); Sooner Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Depositors Sav. Ass'n, 386 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (Miss. 1980) ("Even if [the party] made a mistake, either
in violation of instructions, or in their thinking at the time, there was no mutual mistake.").
78. 519 So. 2d 436 (Miss. 1988).




83. Id. at 438; see also Houser v. Brent Towing Co., 610 So. 2d 363, 365-66 (Miss. 1992).
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with full information and anticipation of such a settlement. Consequently, the
effect of the settlement is a compromise which is as conclusive of the rights of
the parties as a judgment would be and should be enforced accordingly.84
IV THE PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT
Once it has been determined that an agreement to settle has been reached and
it is clear that the other side is attempting to renege, a motion to compel the set-
tlement should be filed with the bankruptcy court.8" This will be a contested
matter under Rule 9014.
To avoid having to file a separate motion to approve a settlement under Rule
9019, the motion to compel should include a request that the settlement be
approved under Rule 9019 and the substantive law on settlements." The motion
should contain all aspects of a motion to approve a settlement under Rule 9019,
including the terms of the settlement, and be noticed to the appropriate parties as
provided by Rule 2002.
The burden of proof on the existence of a settlement and its terms is on the
party seeking to enforce the settlement.' This burden includes proving counsel's
authority to settle where there is a question of an attorney's authority to enter into
settlement.88
V THE AFTERMATH
Even though the bankruptcy court has entered an order compelling the settle-
ment and the settlement has been approved by the court, the litigant and the
attorney involved in the attempted breach may face additional repercussions
flowing from their conduct. While the ethical issues involved in settlement can
be quite complex, especially with regard to the negotiation aspect,89 there are
some equally difficult issues that are associated with the enforcement of a settle-
ment agreement.
First, Rule 9011, "the bankruptcy counterpart of Civil Rule 11 'o provides that
all pleadings must be signed "by at least one attorney of record. .". "" This signa-
ture certifies that the pleading is presented only after the attorney has read it and
that to the best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, information and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and ... law;
and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation or
administration of the case.92
84. Noble Drilling, Inc. v. Davis, 64 E3d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1995).
85. Houston, OTR v. Holder (In re Ornni Video, Inc.), 60 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1995); Huennekens v. Trash
Mgmt. Serv., Inc. (In re Or-Grow, Inc.), 209 B.R. 386, 389 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
86. Omni, 60 F.3d at 231.
87. Or-Grow, 209 B.R. at 390.
88. In re Rhoads Indus., Inc., 162 B.R. 485, 488-89 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
89. See, e.g., David Geronemus, Lies, Damn Lies and Unethical Lies - How to Negotiate Ethically and
Effectively, Bus. LAW TODAY, May-June 1997, at 11.
90. 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9011.02, at 9011-3 (Lawrence P. King, 15th ed., revised 1997).
91. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (a).
92. Id.
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Rule 9011 applies to the enforcement of settlements since the respective counsel
will have to take a position on whether a settlement occurred and what the par-
ties understood the terms of any settlement to be.
Due to the ability of the court to award sanctions for frivolous pleadings under
Rule 9011, attorneys must be sure of what they understand the facts to be regard-
ing the settlement and only file pleadings consistent with that understanding. If
the client agreed to a settlement and then merely changed his mind, challenging a
motion to compel the settlement under the standards of Rule 9011 could be prob-
lematic. Unless some material fact issue on the settlement was truly unresolved
and provided an independent basis for challenge, the litigant and the attorney
may face sanctions for such a contest.
This point is particularly true in light of the amendment to Rule 9011, effective
December 1, 1997. The amended Rule 9011 broadens the scope of the Rule and
includes verbal representations of counsel:
Rule 9011. Signing of Papers; Representations to the Court; Sanctions;
Verification and Copies of Papers
(a) Signature. Every petition, pleading, written motion, and other paper,
except a list, schedule, or statement, or amendments thereto, shall be signed by
at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign all papers. Each paper shall state the
signer's address and telephone number, if any. An unsigned paper shall be
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being
called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court (whether by sign-
ing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a petition, pleading, written motion,
or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of
the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reason-
able under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.3
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission endorsed the amendment to
Rule 9011 in its recent report:
93. National Bankr. Rev. Comm'n Final Report, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENrY YEARS (October 20, 1997),
113 n. 196. (Full report available in print from the United States Government Printing Office or on the internet
at <hup://www.nbrc.gov/index.html>.)
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The Commission endorses the amended Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, to become effective on December 1, 1997, which will
make an attorney's presentation to the court of any petition, pleading, written
motion, or other paper a certification that the attorney made a reasonable
inquiry into the accuracy of that information, and thus will help ensure that
attorneys take responsibility for the information that they and their clients pro-
vide.94
Secondly, the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct apply directly to set-
tlements made by attorneys on behalf of clients. Specifically, Mississippi Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] lawyer shall
abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter."
95
As in Attorney WL. v. The Mississippi Bar, even when an attorney has acted ethi-
cally in settlement for a client, the attorney may still have to defend a Bar com-
plaint.96 Certainly, failure to abide by the Rule could result in a malpractice
claim.97
Rule 8.4(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct provides that "[i]t
is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . ."'I Rule 3.3 prohibits lawyers
from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to the court and
from failing to disclose a material fact to the court "when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client .... " These Rules
of Conduct clearly encompass situations where a client wants to renege on a set-
tlement agreement. When a settlement is effected, the counsel involved should
not acquiesce in a client's request to effectuate a breach. Satisfying such a
request could violate Rules 8.4 and 3.3 governing dishonesty, fraud, and candor
to the tribunal. Moving to withdraw as counsel may pose the only viable option
if the client will not accept the attorney's advice."'
Finally, both litigants and their counsel should be cognizant of the Litigation
Accountability Act of 1988."1 This Act applies to "any civil action commenced
or appealed in any court of record in this state ... ."02 The Act provides the
sanction of an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs against any party or
attorney
if the court, upon the motion of any party or on its own motion, finds that an
attorney or party brought an action, or asserted any claim or defense, that is
without substantial justification, or that the action, or any claim or defense
94. Id. at 112.
95. MississiPPI RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1996).
96. Attorney WL. v. Mississippi Bar, 621 So..2d 235, 237 (Miss. 1993); see also Mays v. Neal, 938 S.W2d
830 (Ark. 1997); In re Stem, 406 A.2d 970 (N.J. 1979); In re Montrey, 511 S.W2d 805 (Mo. 1974).
97. People v. Podoll, 855 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Colo. 1993).
98. MIssissippi RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c) (1996).
99. MISSISSIPPI RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1996).
100. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255 (Miss. 1988).
101. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-55-1 through 11-55-15 (Supp. 1997).
102. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-5(l) (Supp. 1997).
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asserted, was interposed for delay or harassment, or if it finds that an attorney or
party unnecessarily expanded the proceedings by other improper conduct
including, but not limited to, abuse of discovery procedures available under the
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure." 3
The power granted to courts under the Act is in addition to Civil Rule 11, both
state and federal, and Rule 9011.104
VI. CONCLUSION
It comes as no surprise that lawyers are focusing more attention on traditional
concepts of professionalism, collegiality, and civility in litigation." The public
demands it, the courts dictate it, and oaths of attorneys require it. In the context
of settlement agreements, basic notions of honesty and fidelity should be over-
riding principles adhered to by litigants and their attorneys.
In bankruptcy cases, compromises and settlement are essential to the efficient
administration of justice. By definition, bankruptcy cases deal with a limited
pool of assets. Accordingly, litigation of disputes depletes assets of the estate
and further limits creditor recoveries. Once settlement agreements are reached,
there is ample authority for compelling performance, or "holding their feet to the
fire." Moreover, the exposure for the breach may extend beyond compelling
compliance: litigants and their counsel, who are compelled, may be "burned."
103. Id.
104. Stevens v. Lake, 615 So. 2d 1177, 1184 (Miss. 1993).
105. Professionalism Handbook: In Your Practice, With Your Clients & In the Legal System, THE MISSISSIPPI
BAR (1997).
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